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This paper examines the impact of far-right agency on public political tolerance—what
the parties on the far right do to disconnect themselves from accusations of extremism
and thus increase their political tolerance by the public. Examining such patterns is
challenging because of the multiple varieties of party attributes and strategies that are
used by the far right. This paper uses a conjoint survey experiment conducted in the
Norwegian Citizen Panel. Each respondent was presented with one vignette describing
important attributes of a hypothetical far-right initiative and was then asked to evaluate
whether this initiative should be allowed to hold an event. The conjoint design makes
it possible to test the impact of the ideological and organizational varieties of the far
right. The results demonstrate that what the parties on the far right do is crucial for
public political tolerance. Denying extremism and excluding extreme members increase
tolerance. However, the features that the far right is not in control of, such as its ideological
legacy and the fact that some of its members have been convicted of racist speech
negatively affect public political tolerance. The paper concludes that the agency of the
far right is a necessary but not sufficient condition for public political tolerance of the
far right.
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INTRODUCTION
The far right has achieved substantial electoral success over the past few decades. With the rise of
far-right political parties, several scholarly debates have followed. Much of the scholarly and media
attention has centered around the ideology promoted by the far right, which can be interpreted as
exclusionary toward immigrants and minorities, such as Muslims. Some far-right politicians have
been convicted of racism, hate speech, and even Holocaust denial. For these reasons, other political
parties have ostracized the far right and excluded such parties from cooperation. Nevertheless,
many far-right parties have performed well in elections and become influential political players
in many European democracies (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kriesi et al., 2008). This raises the
question: why dowe observe such a pattern where some far-right initiatives are rejected while others
are politically influential?
This study seeks to explain the specific factors and attributes about the far right contributing
to public political tolerance. The study adopts an agency perspective, focusing on what the parties
themselves do to fend off accusations of racism and extremism. Previous research has identified
some important factors that are thought to affect voters’ perceptions of the far right. Some
researchers have identified past ideological ties to historical fascism and the Nazi past as important
explanations for rejecting the far right (Ignazi, 1992; Golder, 2003; Carter, 2005; Art, 2011). Others
have argued that integration into the democratic system helps far-right political parties to fend off
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accusations of racism and extremism (van Heerden and van der
Brug, 2017). Nevertheless, we still lack knowledge of the effects of
such factors on public political tolerance of the far right.
The 2017 presidential election in France is a suitable example
to illustrate why it is necessary to take a closer look at public
political tolerance. Despite a comprehensive internal process to
transform the Rassemblement National (RN)1, Marine Le Pen
lost the election. According to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser
(2018), Macron did not win because it was a pro-Macron election
but, rather, because it was an anti-Le Pen one. Despite attempts to
transform the party, opinion polls showed that two-thirds of the
electorate stated that they would never vote for Le Pen (Mudde
and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, 1684). Why is it that a populist
radical right party such as the RN can undergo comprehensive
transformations yet still be rejected by a large share of the public?
Examining voting patterns can only provide limited answers,
emphasizing the need for a different strategy to look further into
such questions. Gidron et al. (2019) showed that, despite having
achieved substantial electoral success and becoming politically
influential in many countries, the populist radical right party
family is more disliked by voters compared to all other parties
in the system. This paper seeks to dig deeper into this puzzle by
identifying and exploring the individual factors contributing to
public political tolerance of the far right.
This study uses a conjoint survey experiment conducted
in the Norwegian Citizen Panel to identify and explain the
effects of specific attributes of the far right on public political
tolerance. The setting chosen for the experimental design has
been successfully used in classical studies on social and political
tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1979, 1982). In these
classical studies, the respondents were asked to extend (or
reject) certain democratic privileges to political groups that
they dislike. In the study at hand, a representative sample
of voters was asked to provide their opinion on whether
to allow a far-right political group to hold an event aimed
at spreading its political message, and whether they believe
that the far-right group constitues a threat to democracy.
For this experiment, the attributes describing the far-right
political group were randomly assigned. Using this strategy, this
study is able to illustrate the specific factors that contribute
to increased or decreased public political (in)tolerance of the
far right.
This study identifies and explores important, individual
factors about the far right, and their effects on public political
tolerance of far-right political initiatives. The factors and
attributes of the far right that are examined in this study
are analyzed from an agency perspective, separating between
attributes that the far right can control and those over which it has
no control. Using this lens, the study introduces four important
factors about the far right: (1) party institutionalization, (2) the
far-right’s ideological legacy, (3) the explicit denial of extremism
and exclusion of extremist candidates, and (4) the political
message promoted by the far right. The conjoint experiment
used in this study was specifically designed around these factors.
This approach makes it possible to examine such multifaceted
1Previously the Front National.
issues in the same study and to identify their effects on public
political tolerance.
POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY
An important strand of research on the far right has focused on
what political parties, institutions, and elites can do to combat
the far right. Three main strategies have been suggested from
a governmental standpoint: influence public opinion, remedy
attraction to racism (by removing the breeding ground), and
implement repressive measures, such as bans and prosecution
(van Donselaar, 2017). One of the most researched actions
when it comes to combating the far right is exclusion and
non-cooperation. An influential study by Art (2007) focused on
responses from political elites, print media, and civil society.
He argued that, when political parties refuse to cooperate with
the far right, it weakens these parties in three main ways. First,
it sends a signal to voters that any votes they cast for the far
right might be wasted. Second, it sends a signal to voters that
the far-right political parties are illegitimate. Third, it affects the
parties’ capability to recruit competent candidates (Art, 2007).
Conversely, political parties can choose to cooperate with the
far right and thus extend legitimacy to their proposed political
platforms (Bale, 2003).
An important perspective often missed in studies on the
far-right is agency—that is, what the parties themselves do
to strengthen and secure their electoral success and political
influence. An important study by de Lange and Art (2011)
linked the success of the far right and agency. They argued
that populist radical right parties experience success only
if they are built prior to their electoral breakthroughs and
manage to institutionalize rapidly. In addition, having a strong
leader is important for the institutionalization process and the
recruitment of competent candidates.
Currently, we know little about the link between the agency of
the far right and public political tolerance. Thus, an important
aspect to consider when studying the far right is what the far
right does to increase political tolerance. This paper examines
this question, exploring some important attributes of the far right
based on accusations that are often made against it. The aim
is to investigate the effects of these traits on ordinary citizens’
political tolerance of the far right. The following sections will
further explain these factors.
Party Institutionalization
One important characteristic that distinguishes far-right political
initiatives from each other is whether they participate in the
electoral arena. Becoming a political party and participating
in elections can be a strategic decision by the far right to
increase its political tolerance by the public (e.g., by recruiting
competent candidates). Using examples from Geert Wilders in
the Netherlands, van Heerden and van der Brug (2017) show that
a far-right political party is better at fending off accusations of
racism and extremism2 once it has made a successful entry into
2What van Heerden and van der Brug (2017) refer to as demonization.
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the party system. Their results indicate that established far-right
political parties that are represented in parliament stand a better
chance of fending off such accusations from other political parties
and the media.
Having institutionalized as a political party in democratic
institutions can thus serve as a strategy that enables the far right
to be tolerated by a larger share of the public. Previous literature
has shown that parties that reject the democratic system are less
successful than those that work within it (Carter, 2005). Similarly,
one can argue that party institutionalization should be associated
with increased political tolerance because it sends a signal of
working within, and respecting, the democratic system, and rules
of democracy. This same respect for the rules of democracy could
also make the far-right initiative perceived as less of a democratic
threat. From this perspective, party institutionalization itself can
contribute to political tolerance, distinguishing between far-right
political initiatives advancing the same political agenda.
An important point regarding how the dimension of party
institutionalization relates to this study can be found in how the
experiment was designed. The conjoint experiment was designed
based on real-life examples from political parties on the far right,
not on extra-parliamentary far-right organizations. However, the
conjoint treatments in this study differ depending on whether the
far right is presented as an organization or as a political party.
This makes it possible to examine whether the same factors that
these political parties possess make them less likely to be tolerated
by the public if they were extra-parliamentary organizations
rather than political parties. To date, little research has tested this
mechanism in relation to the far right.
The Far Right’s Ideological Legacy
Some researchers have asked why nativism, the core ideology
promoted by the far right, can in some cases lead to electoral
success, whereas in other cases it seem toxic. Ivarsflaten et al.
(2019) emphasized that, after the SecondWorldWar, boundaries
were drawn in Western European democracies to make racism
and extremism illegitimate (see, e.g., Bleich, 2011; Givens and
Case, 2014). This led some scholars to notice that far-right parties
running on an anti-immigration platform tended to fail unless
they had a reputational shield—that is, an ideological legacy that
they could use to fend off accusations of racism or extremism.
Such reputational shields are common among the electorally
successful far-right parties in Western Europe today (Ivarsflaten,
2006). A case in point is the comparison between the British
National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom (UK). While UKIP was
founded in opposition to the EU, the BNP explicitly embraced
a far-right extremist ideology. Experimental survey work found
that in the UK, a policy position associated with UKIP received
substantively larger support than one associated with the BNP,
which had no reputational shield (Blinder et al., 2013; Goodwin,
2014).
Thus, an important factor that the far right is not in control of
is its ideological legacy—that is, how the far right was founded.
Naturally, this ideological legacy has been given attention by
many scholars. It is argued that this is one of the main factors
affecting the electoral success or failure of the far right, which
promotes a nativist ideology (Ignazi, 1992, 2003). Studies have
found that the far-right parties that tended to be most electorally
successful have been ideologically disconnected from Europe’s
Nazi past and historical fascism. They have managed to present
themselves in amanner that separates them from such ideological
ties (Golder, 2003; Carter, 2005; Art, 2011). According to Ignazi
(2003, p. 32), these types of far-right parties—those that “deny
any lineage with historic fascism,” not those that maintain such
ties—are the ones that have become successful in elections.
A key part of the reputational shield argument advanced by
Ivarsflaten (2006) emphasizes the importance of the ideological
legacy of the far right. There are a few examples of contemporary
far-right parties whose ideological legacy is not so explicitly
distanced from past ideological ties. This is true for the RN
and the Sweden Democrats (SD). They represent some of the
successful populist radical-right parties in Western Europe. Both
have managed to achieve substantial electoral success despite
originally growing out of more extreme organizations, thus
having no clear reputational shields. This study agrees with the
existing literature that having links to Europe’s Nazi past and
historical fascism should contribute to public rejection of the
far right. Nevertheless, the two aforementioned parties have
explicitly used their agency and taken actions organizationally
as well as ideologically to distance themselves from any such
connections (Rydgren, 2002; Ivaldi, 2016).
The experiment used in this study tests whether such
connections as well as explicit distancing from such connections
to Europe’s Nazi past contribute to public political tolerance
of the far right, and whether such attributes make the
voters perceive the far right as a threat to democracy. The
experiment provides examples of different ideological legacies
that are common among contemporary far-right political parties,
connecting and disconnecting them from Europe’s Nazi past and
historical fascism. The expectation is that a far-right initiative
that is disconnected from such past ideological ties will be
tolerated by a larger share of the public compared to a far-right
initiative with explicit ties. The ideological legacy of the far-right
political initiative, which was varied in the experiment, is used
as an example of something that the far right itself is not in
control of.
Explicit Distancing From Racism and
Extremism
Some factors are more explicitly related to agency than others.
The third factor included in this study involves distancing from
racism and extremism in more explicit terms. Many far-right
political parties in Western Europe have made changes to their
platforms, personnel, and appearance, making them more likely
to be tolerated by a larger share of the public3. Several far-
right parties—the SD and Danish People’s Party, among others—
have a paragraph in their statutes that explicitly states that they
can dismiss members who harm the party. What is considered
harmful to the party is typically decided by the party’s core
3Pettersson (2020) for example, demonstrates how candidates of populist radical
right parties use their rhetorical strategy to distance themselves from accusations
of racism.
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members. Nevertheless, having such a paragraph in the party
statutes shows the importance of political culture among these
parties and that they have the right and opportunity to dismiss
members who can potentially make them look racist or extremist.
An important example is the transformation of the RN. Jean-
Marie Le Pen, the former leader of the party, has been convicted
of racism several times. In addition, he has insisted on his
right to claim that the Holocaust was merely a detail in history,
thus establishing an explicit signal of connections to historical
fascism. Part of the process of transforming the party was the
announcement of Marine Le Pen, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s daughter,
as party leader in 2011. Four years later, Marine Le Pen kicked
her father out of the party. This decision was made after a series
of extreme statements that she believed weakened the party’s
legitimacy. However, the transformation of the party involved
more than only the decision to remove Jean-Marie Le Pen. It
also involved attracting competent candidates, broadening the
political platform, distancing the party from extreme statements,
and building a solid party organization (e.g., Mayer, 2013, 2018;
Ivaldi, 2016). The purpose of the party transformation was not
necessarily to change the party’s politics but to make the party
less disliked among voters (Ivaldi, 2016).
Other important incidents exemplifying how the far right
explicitly distances itself from racism and extremism include the
internal investigation of 24 members of the SD, which took place
in 2015. Eventually, seven of these members were excluded from
the party, and others left voluntarily. In the most recent election
in Norway, a Progress Party candidate for mayor in the small
town of Nesodden had to withdraw his candidacy after it was
discovered that he was a member of the anti-Islamic organization
called Stop the Islamization of Norway (SIAN). Party leader Siv
Jensen stated explicitly that SIAN membership was incompatible
with Progress Party membership. In such situations, the far-right
parties usually respond by downgrading, relocating, or excluding
the member from the party. Another important example is the
far-right party Vlaams Blok, which was convicted of racism and
cut off from state funding. After the charges were made, the party
reorganized itself into a new party, the Vlaams Belang. These
are all examples of what parties on the far right have done and
continue to do to explicitly fend off accusations of racism and
extremism and maintain order in their political organizations. It
is important for the parties to be able to attract skilled political
candidates, maintain legitimacy, and attract voters (Art, 2007).
These examples emphasize the importance of examining public
political tolerance of the far right through the lens of agency.
Political Message
A final factor that can help explain public political (in)tolerance
of the far right is the political message that it chooses to
promote. The political message of the far right is a clear
indicator of the current ideology that is promoted by the far
right, and it is relevant from an agency perspective; after all,
the far right is responsible for and in control of its political
message. When political organizations and parties on the far
right want to make use of their democratic rights to hold an
event, make a speech, or even protest, does the political message
that they want to promote contribute to political (in)tolerance?
In a free-speech context, the political message of the far right
should not matter. Provided that the far-right initiative is doing
nothing illegal, it has the right to spread its message, even
though one might disagree with it. Similar dilemmas concerning
freedom vs. racism were raised during the Danish cartoon crisis
(Sniderman et al., 2014). The pre-censorship of political messages
is forbidden in Norway, where this experiment took place. This
debate was recently ignited in Norway when SIAN organized
several demonstrations4. At one of these demonstrations, young
antiracism protesters attacked the leader of SIAN after he tore
pages from the Koran. The protesters also attacked the police, and
some were arrested. This facilitated an important debate about
free speech and how the rhetoric of far-right organizations such
as SIAN affect those groups targeted by the far-right’s political
message. Bleich (2011, p. 144) explained this as follows:
Freedom of speech, association, and opinion-as-motive are
core values that protect individual autonomy, foster pluralism,
bolster a commitment to democracy, and lead us toward
fundamental truths. Upholding these values helps explain why
strong proponents of freedom are willing to tolerate some forms
of racism.
The quote above illustrates some of the tensions in the debate
concerning freedom vs. racism and highlights some of the
dilemmas that the respondents in this study have to take into
account when deciding whether to allow a far-right political
initiative to express its views. Where do people draw the line
between the right to free speech and the right to be protected
against racism? Some of these dilemmas were raised when Geert
Wilders was accused of hate speech and Jean-Marie Le Pen
was accused of racism (van Spanje and de Vreese, 2015). Using
examples from Wilders, Verkuyten (2013) showed that anti-
Islamic rhetoric can be used to justify discrimination against
Muslims. He argued that “discrimination becomes a necessary
self-defensive response when our virtuous nature is undermined.
In this context, ingroup members who dare to discriminate
have moral strength whereas those who do not are morally
suspect” (Verkuyten, 2013, p. 347). Verkuyten (2013) further
showed that Wilders uses his anti-Islamic rhetoric to fend off
accusations of discrimination and prejudice by distinguishing
between Muslims as a group and Islam as an ideology. Similarly,
Pettersson (2020) explained that the far right can use its political
message to distance itself from extremism—for example, by
framing immigration politics in more fact-based terms.
In the Dutch election of 2002, Pim Fortuyn, an openly
homosexual sociologist, achieved considerable electoral success
by combining anti-Islamic and liberal values (Bélanger and Arts,
2006; Lubbers and Güveli, 2007). He argued that Islam was a
backward religion owing to its denial of equality for women and
its intolerance of homosexuality (Sniderman and Hagendoorn,
2007, p. 19–20). In this way, Fortuyn used his critique against
immigration and Islam as a way of promoting liberal values and
defending liberal democracy (Akkerman, 2005). This has become
a dominant message among political parties on the far right
(Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) and anti-Islamic activist
groups (Berntzen, 2019). Based on Fortuyn’s electoral success
4The experiment in this paper was fielded before these events took place.
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and the popular use of this discourse among far-right political
parties, it is reasonable to expect such a message to contribute
to increased political tolerance, precisely because it involves an
explicit focus on liberal democratic values. Such a message where
liberal democratic values are promoted could also make the
far-right initiative perceived as less of a threat to democracy.
However, as of now, we have little knowledge of the effects of
promoting such a discourse on public political tolerance.
Taken together, this paper asks what factors contribute to
increased or decreased public political (in)tolerance of the
contemporary far right, and if these factors make the far
right perceived as a threat to democracy. The literature review
introduced four factors that arguably affect public political
tolerance from an agency perspective, emphasizing the factors
that the far right itself controls and those that it does not. How
the far right has institutionalized, how it reacts toward extremist
members, and the political message it chooses to promote are
factors that it can control. Simultaneously, there are factors
that the far right cannot control. The ideological legacy from
when parties on the far right were founded and statements from
extreme members are examples of such factors.
POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND
DEMOCRATIC THREAT
Sullivan et al. (1982, p. 2) conceptualized tolerance as “a
willingness to ‘put up with’ those things one rejects or opposes.”
Studies on political tolerance have successfully asked respondents
to grant certain democratic privileges to political groups that
they dislike or disagree with (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1979,
1982; Petersen et al., 2011). The logic of using such a setting is
that a far-right party or organization can be controversial and
disliked by the public but simultaneously be granted democratic
privileges. The more likely a political group is to be granted
democratic privileges by the public, the higher the degree of
public political tolerance.
Previous studies on political tolerance have shown that an
individual’s level of intolerance of a certain political group is
equivalent to his or her perception of the threat posed by that
group (Stouffer, 1955). This means that intolerance increases the
more the individual perceives the group as threatening important
values or constitutional order (Sullivan et al., 1982, p. 186).
Sullivan et al. (1979, p. 788) found that, when it comes to
tolerance, the least-liked groups were described as “uniformly
bad, undemocratic, and dangerous” by the respondents. The
study at hand includes two dependent variables. The first
dependent variable focuses on political tolerance, the second on
perceived democratic threat. The expectation is that traits that
lead to more intolerance will also lead to perceptions of the far-
right initiative as a larger threat toward democracy. The following
section will elaborate on the experimental setting, study design,
data, and analysis before moving on to the results.
DATA AND METHODS
Petersen et al. (2011) used the concept of political tolerance in
an experimental setting, randomly assigning a range of different
target groups. Despite using a political tolerance setting in which
respondents are asked to grant democratic privileges to a far-
right political group, this study departs from the classical studies
on tolerance by not assigning target groups. Instead, this study
digs deeper into certain attributes of far-right political parties
and organizations and examines how these attributes affect
tolerance. The evidence presented is based on a conjoint survey
experimental design, whereby the respondents were randomly
assigned to evaluate one far-right political party or organization
(N = 4,221). Conjoint design has become common in survey
experimental research due to its advantage of being able to
test multiple treatment variations in the same randomized
experimental study (Hainmuller et al., 2014). The conjoint
experiment in this study departs somewhat fromwhat is normally
seen in conjoint designs. Rather than a forced choice-based
design, the respondents were presented with a vignette design
describing a hypothetical far-right initiative. Similar conjoint
designs have been successfully used in previous studies on
terrorism (e.g., Huff and Kertzer, 2018). The respondents in this
study were asked to evaluate one vignette only. As such, their
evaluations of the far-right organization or political party were
not biased by previous evaluations.
The logic behind investigating the attributes of the far right
rather than far-right target groups is that, when varying target
groups, we cannot know exactly what features of a particular
party contribute to public political tolerance. This experiment
combines the findings from previous studies into an experimental
design that is able to test multiple factors simultaneously. By
using hypothetical cases, we gain control over exactly which
factors contribute to (in)tolerance of the far right. The number
of attributes varied in the conjoint experiment provide a total of
108 different versions of far-right political initiatives5.
The Experiment
One of the goals of the experimental design was to capture the
heterogeneity of the far right. The experiment included attributes
concerning what type of organization the far-right is, what legacy
it has, its stance toward its extremist members, and the message
it seeks to promote. It was important to ensure that the various
hypothetical cases in the experimental design were indeed far
right. This meant, for example, that they all promoted an anti-
immigrant political message, typical of far-right political parties.
For variation purposes, the experiment also included the type of
event that the far-right organization or political party wanted to
hold, as well as where it would take place6.
An important part of the design, as shown in Table 1, is that,
although hypothetical, the factors are varied based on real-life
cases. For example, some parties on the far right have grown
out of organizations with ties to historical fascism (e.g., the
BNP and SD), while others have grown out of rural or agrarian
movements (e.g., the Swiss People’s Party and the Finns Party).
Opposing all aspects of right-wing extremism is common among
populist radical right parties. However, many of these parties
have members who have been accused of racism or hate speech.
5The varied conjoint treatments are 2× 3× 2× 3× 3= 108.
6These variations have some effect on political (in)tolerance. The results for all
treatment variations can be found in the Supplementary Material.
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TABLE 1 | Conjoint treatments.
(A) Party institutionalization Consider...
...An organization
...A political party
(B) Ideological legacy They were founded...
...as a neo-Nazi organization.
...through protests against asylum policy.
...through rural protests in several regions.
(C) Denial of extremism ...Today, they oppose everything about right-wing extremism.
[No mention]
(D) Counter-evidence It turns out that the...
...[Organization] has a core member that has been convicted of racist speech.
...[Organization] has a core member that has been convicted of racist speech, but that now has been forced to leave the [Organization].
...[Organization] has a few members that deny the Holocaust.
The [Organization] has now asked to hold [type of event] at
[place]...
(E) Political message ...to spread their message that...
...Norway needs stricter asylum policies.
...Islam constitutes a serious threat to democratic values, gay rights, and women’s rights.
...Norway needs to preserve its white cultural heritage.
Outcome 1 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the organization should be allowed to do so?
Outcome 2 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the organization described above constitutes a threat to democracy?
Some even have members who have been convicted of Holocaust
denial (e.g., the RN). The promotion of a political message
regarding the need for stricter asylum policies is common on the
far right, as is the message that Islam is a threat to democratic
and liberal values. The preservation of white cultural heritage
is a message not common among populist radical right parties
but it is included to send a signal about a more extreme version
of the current ideology promoted by the far-right initiative.
Importantly, similar statements have been promoted by political
candidates of far-right parties. For example, Elisabeth Peterson,
a top SD candidate in Växjö Municipality, stated, “one shall be
born Swedish and have Swedish parents” as the definition of
“Swedishness” after posting a song on Facebook with the lyrics
“Swedes are white and the country is ours” (Bergløff, 2018). The
party responded by dismissing the candidate and removing her
opportunity to run for election.
The data for this study were collected during the fall of
2018 using the Norwegian Citizen Panel (2018), a representative
online panel whose participants were drawn directly from the
Norwegian National Population Registry (Skjervheim et al.,
2018)7. The NCP is a research-purpose panel with more than
6,000 active participants. The panel members participating in
the survey complete an online questionnaire three times per
year each lasting for about 15minutes. The data collected for
this study was fielded between October 17th and November
5th in 2018. The panel members were recruited by email8.
7Although directly drawn from the Norwegian National Population Registry, there
are some issues of representativeness. Younger people, as well as those with lower
education are underrepresented (Skjervheim et al., 2018, p. 7–10).
8The respondents participating in the survey were recruited in four rounds—wave
1 (November 2013), wave 3 (October 2014), wave 8 (March 2017), and wave 11
(March 2018). The respondents were invited by post and thereafter registered their
email address for further participation in the panel. More information on sampling
Each respondent was presented with one vignette that included
randomized attributes of the hypothetical far-right initiative. The
respondents were then asked to answer two questions based on
the far-right initiative. The first concerned whether they should
be allowed to hold the public event, and the second related to
whether they believed that the far-right initiative constituted a
threat to democracy9.
The analysis of the treatment effects in the conjoint design
follows the advice of Leeper et al. (2020) presenting the results
by their marginal means rather than AMCE (Hainmuller et al.,
2014). The marginal means represent the mean outcome for
each conjoint treatment factor, averaging across all other features
(Leeper et al., 2020, p. 210). An advantage by reporting the
marginal means is that none of the attributes are used as
baselines. For example, Leeper et al. (2020, p. 211) argue that
a positive AMCE is “only higher relative to whatever category
that serves as the baseline.” In the study at hand, each of the
experimental attributes should be compared against each other.
This makes the marginal means ideally suited. Robust clustered
standard errors at the respondent level are used in the analysis.
RESULTS
The following sections will present the results of this study in
a stepwise manner. First, because this experiment includes 108
different far-right political initiatives, it is important to consider
the least and most tolerated ones. The results section therefore
starts by establishing the baselines. It then moves on to consider
the independent factors related to the far right, as these are used
and representativeness is available in the Norwegian Citizen Panel methodology
reports (Skjervheim et al., 2018).
9An example of how the experiment looked to the respondents can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
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to measure the individual effects of these attributes. The third
section of the results includes an in-depth exploration of the
effects of explicitly denying extremism and excluding extreme
members. Finally, the results of response heterogeneity are
presented to show whether ordinary citizens respond differently
based on their political background.
Baselines of Political Tolerance and
Democratic Threat
One important aspect to consider when examining the results
from the survey experiment is the mean political tolerance of the
far-right initiatives. In this experiment, the mean response to the
dependent variable of political tolerance was 47, meaning that
about half of the respondents agreed that the hypothetical far-
right initiative should be allowed to hold the event. This indicates
that the experiment was designed in a balanced way: some factors
increased and some decreased public political tolerance. The
mean far-right initiative in this experiment was placed in the
middle—that is, an indication that the political initiatives in the
study are highly contested.
Although the study includes political tolerance and perceived
democratic threat of the best and worst cases, it is important to
emphasize that the goal was not to show how variations of the far
right are placed on a scale of tolerance but, rather, to show which
factors contribute to the increased or decreased (in)tolerance of
the far right. The goal was to gain more knowledge of the details
that drive public political tolerance. The use of hypothetical cases
made this possible.
Table 2 shows the percentage of respondents agreeing that
what would most likely be viewed as the “best” and “worst” far-
right initiatives presented in the experimental vignettes should
be allowed to hold the event. The experiment was created so that
some combinations would include factors that the far right is not
in control of, such as its ideological legacy and the fact that it has
extreme members. The best case presented in Table 2 represents
a political party that was founded through district protests; its
members deny extremism. One member was convicted of racism
but was excluded from the party. It asked to hold a public
event concerning the Islamic threat to liberal democratic values.
Meanwhile, the worst case in Table 2 represents an organization
that was founded as a neo-Nazi organization. The respondents
were not shown any information about extremism denial. The
organization asked to hold an event in a public place to promote
its message about preserving white culture. It also had a few
members who were Holocaust deniers.
The results presented in Table 2 show that, regarding both
political tolerance and democratic threat, substantial differences
TABLE 2 | Best vs. worst far-right initiative.
Agree % CI lower CI upper
Best case, political tolerance 78 73 83
Worst case, political tolerance 31 25 36
Best case, democratic threat 23 34 40
Worst case, democratic threat 69 66 72
exist between the best and worst cases. For the “best case” 78% of
the respondents agreed that the far-right political party should
be allowed to hold the event. It is noticeable that the worst-
case scenario was located at the other end of the scale, with a
tolerance score of 31%, a difference of more than 40-percentage-
points. Similarly, the best case was perceived as less of a threat
to democracy—only 23% of the voters agreed that it constituted
a threat to democracy. For the worst far-right case, 69% of the
voters agreed that it constituted a threat to democracy. These
striking differences in political tolerance and democratic threat
demonstrate that while some far-right organizations are tolerated
and granted democratic privileges, others are rejected. These
results indicate that much of the variation found between the far-
right initiatives can be explained by the attributes accounted for
in the experiment.
Considering the Individual Factors
After establishing the baselines, the individual factors and main
results can be examined more closely. Figure 1 shows the results
of two outcome variables: political tolerance and perceived
democratic threat. Higher values indicate increased political
tolerance in the plot on the left side. In the plot on the right
side, higher values indicate increased democratic threat. The plot
shows 84% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.
The results from Figure 1 indicate that political tolerance and
perceived democratic threat are very similar. In this experiment,
people did not differentiate between these two questions—the
lower the political tolerance, the higher the perceived democratic
threat. This corresponds to what previous studies on political
tolerance have found (e.g., Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1979,
1982).
Based on the literature review, party institutionalization
should contribute to public political tolerance of the far right.
In this study, the experiment differentiated between a political
party and an organization. The results show that there is a
statistically significant difference in the dimension showing party
institutionalization. A larger share of the public is willing to
tolerate a far-right political party than they are to tolerate a far-
right organization. However, whether the far right is presented
as an organization or political party makes no difference with
regard to whether voters perceive it as a threat to democracy.
Nevertheless, as argued by van Heerden and van der Brug (2017),
the results might indicate that it is easier for political parties to
distance themselves from accusations of racism and extremism
than for extra-parliamentary organizations.
These results support the study of van Heerden and van der
Brug (2017) and the expected logic explained in the literature
review—more voters are willing to tolerate a far-right political
party than an organization. However, the results provide no clear
indication of what exactly causes the public to evaluate far-right
organizations differently from political parties. This underscores
the need for more tests and experimental evidence to examine the
mechanisms of party institutionalization and political tolerance.
The second factor included in the experiment is concerned
with ideological legacy, emphasizing the far-right initiatives’
relationship to Europe’s Nazi past. This is particularly important
in terms of agency, as the legacy of the far right is a factor that it
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FIGURE 1 | Results: Factors contributing to the political (in)tolerance and perceived democratic threat.
cannot control. The results show clearly that an explicit indicator
of a relationship with historical fascism results in lower public
political tolerance. A larger share of the electorate disagrees
that the far-right initiative should be allowed to hold the event
that it has asked for if it is made clear that the initiative was
founded as a neo-Nazi organization. In addition, 57% of the
respondents agreed that the neo-Nazi organization constitutes
a threat to democracy. This result is underscored by the gap
in treatment effects between the far-right initiatives that were
founded as neo-Nazi organizations and those founded through
more ordinary asylum protests. This supports the work of Ignazi
(1992, 2003) and Carter (2005), who maintain that having an
explicit legacy attached to historical fascism and Europe’s Nazi
past is an unsuccessful strategy for the far right. In addition,
a close examination of the two other treatment factors reveals
that being founded through district protest is no different from
being founded through asylum protest. Based on the literature
on reputational shields we could expect differences between these
two legacies. However, it seems clear that it is not necessarily
the legacy of something different from immigration policies that
matters for political tolerance but, rather, the importance of
being disconnected from Europe’s Nazi past. This supports the
expectation based on the literature review—a larger share of the
public will tolerate a far-right initiative if it is disconnected from
historical fascism.
The third factor included in the experiment concerned how
the far right explicitly distances itself from accusations of racism
and extremism. This was tested through two different sets of
treatment factors in the conjoint experiment. The first conjoint
treatment included in the experiment was the explicit denial
of right-wing extremism, as exemplified by a number of far-
right parties in Western Europe. The results show that there is
a six-percentage-point difference between the far-right initiatives
that explicitly deny extremism and those for which no such
information was provided. The same difference is found for
perceived democratic threat. The next experimental treatment
for this third set of explanatory factors, also exemplified by
a number of far-right parties in Western Europe, is labeled
“counter-evidence” in Figure 1. The results show that each of
these factors contribute to explaining public political tolerance of
the far right. Having a member who has been convicted of racism
places the far right below the 50% threshold of political tolerance.
However, if the member is excluded from the party, indicating
that the party has taken action and does not accept having such
members in the organization, the far-right initiative is placed
above the same threshold. Finally, as expected, having members
who explicitly deny the Holocaust makes it more likely that a
larger share of the public will reject the far-right initiative. These
results clearly show that how the far right distances itself from
racism and extremism contributes to public political tolerance.
However, having extreme members that deny the Holocaust, for
example, significantly decreases tolerance. These results support
the expectations based on the literature review—a larger share of
the public will tolerate a far-right political initiative that excludes
extreme members and explicitly denies extremism.
The political message promoted by the far right is the final
factor included in the experiment. The results show the same
large differences with regard to citizens’ political tolerance of
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the far right. As previously explained, the background for
including the political message was to send a signal of the
political initiatives’ current ideological standpoint. In addition,
the message that the far-right initiative wants to promote could
affect citizens’ political tolerance based on previous debates
concerning freedom vs. racism (e.g., Bleich, 2011); the results
demonstrate that this is the case. For the far-right initiative
that wants to spread a message concerning the preservation of
white culture, we see more than 10-percentage-points difference
in political tolerance compared to the far-right initiative that
wants to spread a message concerning the Islamic threat to liberal
values. These results do, to some extent, support the expected
relationship—a larger share of the public will tolerate a far-
right initiative that promotes liberal values in criticizing Islam.
However, although it is located on the positive side of the 50%
threshold, the difference between promoting liberal values and
promoting stricter asylum policies is not statistically significant
for political tolerance. However, the difference is statistically
significant for perceived democratic threat. What is clear is that
the ideology promoted by the contemporary far right matters
with regard to political tolerance. Future studies should examine
this pattern more closely.
Digging Deeper Into Agency
This section digs deeper into what the far right does to disconnect
itself from racism and extremism. Figure 2 demonstrates the
more explicit measures that the far right takes to increase public
political tolerance. The figure on the left shows the main results
for all the conjoint treatments based on whether the far-right
initiatives either explicitly denied everything concerning right-
wing extremism or whether no such information was given to
the respondents. Overall, the results show a significant difference
between explicitly denying extremism and not providing such
information—a larger share of the public is willing to tolerate the
far-right initiative that explicitly denies extremism. Interestingly,
the distance is largest for some of the more severe attributes,
namely, between the initiatives that have a neo-Nazi legacy and
those that want to promote the preservation of white culture.
For the far-right initiative with a neo-Nazi legacy, there is close
to 10-percentage-points difference between denying extremism
and not providing such information. The same result is found for
the far-right organization that promotes the preservation of white
culture. However, it is important to emphasize that the results do
not indicate that denying extremism turns the far-right initiative
into a fully tolerated political alternative. What the results do
indicate is that distancing from extremism—for example, by
explicitly denying it—is necessary for public political tolerance
of the far right10. The same pattern is found for the figure on
the right. It represents the results from two treatment factors of
counter-evidence. The right side of Figure 2 demonstrates the
results of citizens’ political tolerance depending on whether the
far-right initiative was presented as having a member who was
convicted of racist speech but who was later excluded or whether
the organization had a few members who denied the Holocaust.
The results show that the public is more likely to reject the far-
right initiative with Holocaust-denying members compared to
the far-right initiative whose member was forced to leave the
organization. Nevertheless, in this case, as in the previous one, we
see most intolerance toward the more severe treatment factors,
such as preserving white culture and being founded as a neo-Nazi
10It is worth mentioning that the treatment condition concerning the denial of
extremism is rather generic. Future studies could examine more concrete aspects
of extremism denial—such as opposition to particular extremist groups, symbols
or ideas.
FIGURE 2 | Results: Denial of extremism and counter-evidence.
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organization, even if the far right takes action and excludes the
more extreme members.
The baselines of political tolerance presented earlier in this
study showed that 31% of the respondents agreed that the “worst”
far-right initiative should be allowed to hold the event in a public
place. Regarding the most tolerated political initiative, 78% of the
respondents agreed that the far right should be allowed to do the
same. The analyses presented in this study show that, by adding
a signal concerning direct ties to historical fascism and Europe’s
Nazi past with treatment conditions such as a neo-Nazi legacy,
political tolerance decreases by about 10-percentage-points for
each treatment factor until it hits 31% for the least tolerated
far-right initiative in this experiment. This underscores what the
literature on the far right has argued—that an ideological legacy
tied to historical fascism and Europe’s Nazi past is an unsuccessful
strategy for the far right (Ignazi, 1992; Ivarsflaten, 2006; Art,
2011).
Response Heterogeneity
An important question to ask is whether voters who are
sympathetic toward the far right themselves respond differently
to questions about political tolerance. It could be the case
that supporters of the far right perceive the far-right initiative
presented in the conjoint vignettes differently from how the
respondents of other parties would. Because the attributes in the
conjoint experiment are based on real far-right political parties, it
is interesting to examine if the supporters of such parties perceive
these traits differently from non-supporters. The final part of the
results in this study address whether political tolerance of the far
right varies between voters with different political backgrounds.
To test whether supporters of the far right responded
differently to the question of political tolerance Figure 3
demonstrates the mean response separating between voters
who like and dislike the Norwegian Progress Party—a populist
radical right party that attracts voters with nativist attitudes
(e.g., Jupskås, 2015). The results show that there are substantial
differences in how people judge the far-right initiatives’
democratic rights based on whether they like or dislike
the Progress Party. The respondents who like the party
are substantially more tolerant toward the far-right initiative
compared to the respondents who dislike the party11.
The respondents who dislike the Progress Party consistently
evaluate the hypothetical far-right initiative below the 50%
threshold, while those who like the Progress Party consistently
evaluate it above the 50% threshold. There is, for example,
a difference of more than 15-percentage-points in political
tolerance with regard to preserving white culture among the two
groups. This indicates that the same far-right initiative would be
allowed to hold the public event by the group of voters who like
the Progress Party but would be rejected by the group of voters
who dislike the Progress Party.
However, it is important to emphasize that these differences
are related to levels and not to the specific conjoint treatments.
The respondents do make the same overall distinctions: voters
who like the Progress Party make the same distinctions between
preserving white culture and Islamic threat, between being
founded as neo-Nazi and being founded through district protests,
11Response heterogeneity was also analyzed for gender and education. The results
show similar patterns and can be found in the Supplementary Material.
FIGURE 3 | Results: Public political tolerance contingent on political background.
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and between Holocaust denial and the exclusion of racist
members. Thus, the overall patterns found in the main analysis
also seem to hold for voters who themselves support the far right.
The results of this study indicate that voters at both ends of the
political spectrum perceive the message concerning the far-right
initiative in the same way. Voters from both camps make the
same distinctions on conjoint treatments, although they respond
to differing degrees. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize
that this a descriptive comparison. Because the affinity for the
Progress Party is not random, other confounding factorsmay also
be causally responsible for these differences.
This analysis demonstrates that voters who are sympathetic to
the far right make the same overall distinctions with regard to the
experimental treatments as other voters do. However, there are
large differences in terms of the levels: voters who are sympathetic
toward the far right are generally more likely to tolerate the far-
right initiative, while other voters are more likely to reject it. This
indicates that it is important for parties on the far right to distance
themselves from extremism. This is not necessarily important
for gaining more voters, as those sympathetic toward the far
right support them nevertheless, but for becoming politically
influential and tolerated by those who are not sympathetic toward
them. Overall, the results demonstrate that what far-right parties
do is crucial for public political tolerance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, public political tolerance of the far right is examined
through the lens of agency—what the parties on the far right
do to disconnect themselves from accusations of extremism and
thus increase their political tolerance on the part of the public.
The results have shown that several important attributes of the
far right take part in shaping public political tolerance and
perceived democratic threat. This study tested four such factors
for which the agency of the far right varies. The four factors
are variations of what the far right is and is not in control
of: (1) party institutionalization, (2) its ideological legacy, (3)
its distancing from racism and extremism, and (4) the political
message it promotes. The main findings revealed in this conjoint
experiment clearly show that the agency of the far right matters
for public political tolerance. What the parties do affects their
likelihood of being granted democratic privileges by ordinary
citizens. When a far-right initiative is a political party rather
than an extra-parliamentary organization, it promotes a political
message about the Islamic threat to Western values, denies any
links to right-wing extremism, and dismisses extreme members
and candidates; this increases public political tolerance of the far
right. However, having explicit links to historical fascism, such
as being founded as a neo-Nazi organization, or having political
candidates who make extreme statements is something the far
right cannot control, and this has negative consequences for
public political tolerance of the far right.
Although the far right has become successful in elections and
managed to become politically influential, it is still identified as
the party family that a large share of voters would never vote for
(Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, 1684). The results of this
study add to our knowledge of why we observe such a pattern.
The SD and the RN are particularly interesting cases. Both
parties have grown to a greater or lesser extent of more extreme
organizations: while the SD grew explicitly from an extremist
organization, the RN originated from an extreme-right milieu.
In combination with political candidates occasionally giving
extreme statements in the media, these signs can contribute to
decreased public political tolerance and prevent these parties
from becoming politically influential. However, as previously
explained, both parties have taken advantage of their agency and
made significant changes to their platforms and organizations,
for example, by dismissing extreme members (Ivaldi, 2016;
Rydgren and van der Meiden, 2018). The results presented in this
paper demonstrate that voters respond to signs about right-wing
extremism. At the same time, voters also respond to indications
that the far right distances itself from right-wing extremism.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the experiment
presented in this paper did not include all the relevant factors
that are likely to have an effect on public political tolerance of
the far right. For example, it does not include how other political
parties or the news media have responded to the far right. As
Art (2007) argued, ostracizing the far right sends a signal that
voting for them is a wasted vote, while cooperating with the far
right increases its legitimacy. Such elite cues are likely to affect
the public’s views of the far right as well (see, e.g., Zaller, 1992).
However, like elite responses, public political tolerance of the far
right is about something specific. It is not based on frivolous
arguments to reject the far right; rather, it is based on arguments
about substantive issues. These issues have also been included
in this conjoint experiment and are demonstrated by the study
results. Public political tolerance of the far right is related to
substantives. Rejection of the far right is caused by clear signs of
right-wing extremism and connections to the Nazi past: having a
neo-Nazi legacy, having members who deny the Holocaust, and
promoting the preservation of white culture. These results hold
for all segments of voters and are no different for those voters
who themselves support the far right.
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